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Abstract—Continuous exposure of location information, even with spatially cloaked resolution, may lead to breaches of location
privacy due to statistics-based inference attacks. An alternative and complementary approach to spatial cloaking based location
anonymization is to break the continuity of location exposure by introducing techniques, such as mix-zones, where no application
can trace user movements. Several factors impact on the effectiveness of mix-zone approach, such as user population, mix-zone
geometry, location sensing rate and spatial resolution, as well as spatial and temporal constraints on user movement patterns.
However, most of the existing mix-zone proposals fail to provide effective mix-zone construction and placement algorithms that
are resilient to timing and transition attacks. This paper presents MobiMix, a road network based mix-zone framework to protect
location privacy of mobile users traveling on road networks. It makes three original contributions. First, we provide the formal
analysis on the vulnerabilities of directly applying theoretical rectangle mix-zones to road networks in terms of anonymization
effectiveness and resilience to timing and transition attacks. Second, we develop a suite of road network mix-zone construction
methods that effectively consider the above mentioned factors to provide higher level of resilience to timing and transition attacks,
and yield a specified lower-bound on the level of anonymity. Third, we present a set of mix-zone placement algorithms that
identify the best set of road intersections for mix-zone placement considering the road network topology, user mobility patterns
and road characteristics. We evaluate the MobiMix approach through extensive experiments conducted on traces produced by
GTMobiSim on different scales of geographic maps. Our experiments show that MobiMix offers high level of anonymity and high
level of resilience to timing and transition attacks, compared to existing mix-zone approaches.
Index Terms—Location Privacy, Mix-zone, Location-based Applications, k-anonymity.
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1 INTRODUCTION
We are entering an era where people and vehicles are be-
ing connected and tracked continuously and automatically.
Such location tracking, on one hand, can offer many life-
enriching experiences and services to mobile users, and
on the other hand, open doors to exposure of enormous
amount of potentially sensitive information, leading to the
intrusion of location privacy. We can classify location
privacy research into three broad categories.
The first category is policy-based solutions that restrict
access through privacy policies. Such policies typically
provide an option for users to turn off location based
services or to refuse being tracked [2].
The second category is represented by location k-
anonymization techniques which compute a spatially
cloaked location region that has k mobile users inside
it. This approach degrades the resolution of location in-
formation in a controlled fashion to ensure location k-
anonymity. A subject is considered k-anonymous if its
location is indistinguishable from that of k  1 other users
[4], [14], [21]. Location k   anonymization approaches
are targeted at the applications that do not require true
identity or pseudo-identity of mobile users, such as finding
nearby gas-stations or restaurants, and notifying the sale
price of items of interest when a user passes a shopping
mall. However, location k-anonymization techniques are
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ineffective when the location based services require identity
or pseudo-identity of users, such as accessing subscribed
content (songs, audios) or sending a printing request while
on the move. This is because when identity or pseudo-
identity of users are associated with the publication of
spatially cloaked regions, the continuous exposure of lo-
cation information combined with the persistent identity or
pseudo-identity can lead to the breach of location privacy
due to statistics-based inference attacks [22].
The third category of location privacy research is embod-
ied by mix-zone based approaches. Mix-zones are regions
in space where a set of users enter, change pseudonyms
and exit in a way such that the mapping between their old
and new pseudonyms is not revealed [5], [11], [12], [13].
In contrast to controlling the resolutions of locations used
in spatial cloaking based location privacy solutions, mix-
zones protect location privacy by changing pseudonyms
at selective locations such that it is very hard to link
new pseudonyms with old pseudonyms. Thus, the frequent
changing of users’ pseudonyms through setting up mix-
zones in selected locations can protect location privacy by
effectively breaking the association of users’ pseudonym
with a sequence of location exposures [5]. Mix-zones are
location privacy solutions that are effective for the LBSs
that require identity or pseudonym of users.
The research presented in this paper falls into the third
category. Most of the existing mix-zone proposals are
straightforward application of theoretical mix-zones [5] to
road network environments. We argue that these approaches
are vulnerable to both timing and transition attacks. Con-
cretely, theoretic mix-zones are constructed independently
of the spatially constrained road networks with the assump-
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a mix-zone, thus it is hard to link old pseudonym to new
pseudonym as long as k users enter and exit the mix-zone at
the same time. However, such assumption is no longer true
for mobile users in the real world, because in reality people
travel in spatially constrained networks or walk-paths. Thus
the number of entry points and exit points for a given mix-
zone is finite and often limited. An adversary can utilize
the timing information of users’ entry into and exit from
a mix-zone and the non-uniformity in the transitions taken
at the road intersections to guess the mapping between the
old and new pseudonyms [11].
In this paper we present MobiMix, a road network based
Mix-zone framework to protect location privacy of mobile
users. Compared to the existing approaches, the MobiMix
mix-zones have a number of unique features. First, the
MobiMix mix-zones are developed based on a formal
study of the assumptions of the theoretic mix-zone model
and the detrimental effect on pseudonym anonymity when
certain assumptions are violated. We argue that effective
mix-zones should be constructed and placed by taking
into consideration of both road network characteristics and
motion behavior of mobile users. Second, we introduce an
adversary model that launches attacks based on the road
network characteristics and associated motion behavior and
present the MobiMix Mix-zone model for constructing road
network aware mix-zones that are robust against timing
attacks and transition attacks. Third, we develop a suite
of attack resilient mix-zone construction and placement
techniques that guarantee unlinkability between the old and
new pseudonyms. Our algorithms take into account multiple
factors in constructing mix-zones, such as the road network
characteristics, the timing and the transitioning probability
of users in terms of their movement trajectory. We formally
analyze and experimentally validate the robustness of our
MobiMix approach against timing attacks and transition
attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes the constraints and anonymity of ideal mix-zones.
Section 3 discusses the characteristics of road networks, the
challenges of constructing mix-zones on road networks and
the MobiMix road network mix-zone model. We introduce
our attack-resilient mix-zone construction techniques and
present a detailed analysis of the timing and transition
attacks in Section 4. Section 5 presents the MobiMix
placement algorithms for deploying mix-zones on a road
network. Section 6 evaluates MobiMix and its algorithms
through extensive experiments conducted on traces from
GTMobiSim [19] using different scales of geographic maps.
We review the related work in Section 7 and conclude the
paper in Section 8.
2 ANALYSIS OF THEORETICAL MIX-ZONES
Theoretical mix-zones are ideal mix-zones that provide the
maximum possible anonymity to the participating users
by ensuring a set of properties. Informally, a mix-zone
of k participants refers to as a k-anonymization region in
which a set of k users enter in some order and change
pseudonyms but none leave before all k users enter the mix-
zone. These k users exit the mix-zone in an order different
from their order of arrival, providing unlinkability between
their entering and exiting events. Formally, a theoretical
mix-zone is defined as follows:
Definition 1: A mix-zone Z is said to offer k-anonymity
for a set A of users iff
1) The set A has k or more members, i.e., jAj  k.
2) All users in A must enter the mix-zone Z before any
user i 2 A exits. Thus, there exists a point in time
where all k users of A are inside the zone.
3) Each user i 2 A, entering the mix-zone Z through
an entry point ei 2 E and leaving at an exit point
oi 2 O, spends a completely random duration of time
inside.
4) The probability of transition between any point of en-
try to any point of exit follows a uniform distribution.
i.e., an user entering through an entry point, e 2 E, is
equally likely to exit in any of the exit points, o 2 O.
Figure 1(a) shows a mix-zone of three participants, a, b and
c exiting with new pseudonyms p, q and r.
In the theoretical mix-zone model, the anonymity is
measured in terms of the unlinkability between the old
and new pseudonyms. For user i, exiting with a new
pseudonym, i0, let pi0!j denote the probability of mapping
i0 to j, where j 2 A. According to Definition 1, the
theoretical mix-zone ensures an equi-probable distribution
of mapping i0 to j 2 A. In other words, for every outgoing
user, i0, it is equally probable for i0 to be any of the k
users in the anonymity set A, having pi0!j = 1jAj . In other
words, in an ideal mix-zone, the new pseudonym of user, i
is indistinguishable from that of jAij other users. Therefore,
the entropy, H(i0) of each outgoing user i0 is computed as
follows [6], [7]
H(i0) =  
X
j2A
pi0!j  log2(pi0!j)
The Entropy is a measure of the amount of information
required to break the anonymity provided by the system.
Next, we discuss the significance of the two important
assumptions in the mix-zone model namely (i) users stay
for a random amount of time inside, and (ii) users follow
uniform transition probability when entering and exiting a
mix-zone.
When the users inside the mix-zone spend random
amount of time, it ensures a random reordering between
the entry and exit orders providing a strong unlinkability
between their old and new pseudonyms. However, a mix-
zone that does not ensure random duration of time inside for
its users usually leaks information [5], [11]. Such leakage
may aid attackers to infer the mapping between the old and
new pseudonyms of users. For example, when all users
spend a constant time inside, the system would simply
function in a FIFO (first-in-first-out) style, with the first
exit event corresponding to the first entry event and so on.
In that case, even though the users might have changed
pseudonyms inside, their mapping from the old and new
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pseudonyms can still be inferred. A good mix-zone should
therefore ensure sufficient randomness in the time spent
inside it in order to obtain a high anonymity in terms of
unlinkability after the pseudonym change process.
Similarly in a theoretical mix-zone, the probability of
transition between an entry point and an exit point fol-
lows a uniform distribution. By relaxing this assumption,
some transitions between entry and exit points may be
more probable than the others. The attacker can use such
knowledge to infer the mapping between the old and
new pseudonyms. For example, if some transitions are
less probable, the attacker may eliminate the pseudonym
mappings corresponding to those transitions and thereby
improve the success rate of his inference.
3 MOBIMIX: OVERVIEW
In this section, we present an overview of the MobiMix
framework. We begin by introducing the challenges im-
posed by road networks for the construction of mix-zones.
3.1 Problems with Theoretical Mix-zones
Theoretical mix-zones assume mobile users move in an
Euclidian space without any spatial constraints. In the real
world, mobile users always move on a spatially constrained
space, such as road networks or walk paths. Each road
network mix-zone corresponds to a road intersection on a
road network. Mix-zones constructed at road intersections
have a limited number of ingress and egress points corre-
sponding to the incoming and outgoing road segments of
the intersection. Furthermore, users in a road network mix-
zone are also constrained by the limited trajectory paths
and speed of travel that are limited by the underlying road
segments and the travel speed designated by their road class
category [3]. Thus, users are not able to stay for random
amount of time inside a road network mix-zone and the
assumption that users follow uniform transition probability
when entering and exiting the mix-zone is no longer true.
For example, in Figure 1(b), users a and b enter the road
intersection from segment 2 and turn on to segment 4. Users
c and d enter from segment 1 and leave on segment 2. When
user a and b exit the mix-zone on segment 1 with their new
pseudonyms, say  and , the attacker tries to map their
new pseudonyms  and  to some of the old pseudonyms
a,b, c, and d of the same users. The new pseudonym  is
more likely to be mapped to two of the old pseudonyms,
a or b, than the other pseudonyms because users a and b
entered the mix-zone well ahead of users c and d and it is
thus less probable for c and d to leave the mix-zone before
users a and b given the speed and trajectory of travel. Here,
the limited randomness on the time spent inside a road
network mix-zone introduces more challenges to construct
efficient mix-zones. Similarly, in Figure 1(b), in order for
the attacker to map  and  to c and d, the old pseudonyms,
users c and d should have taken a left turn from segment 1
to segment 4 and users a and b should have taken an U -turn
on segment 2. Based on common knowledge of inference,
the attacker knows that the transition probability of an U  
turn is small and the mapping of  and  to c and d is very
less probable. Hence, an efficient road network mix-zone
should be resilient to such transition and timing attacks.
Next, we introduce the attack models and the anonymity
measures for road network mix-zones.
3.2 Adversary Model
We assume that an adversary associated with an untrusted
location based service provider may obtain a time series
pseudonyms used by the mobile clients. The adversary is
considered successful if he can utilize timing and transi-
tion based inference to infer the correct linkage between
a pseudonym observed from the service requests sent
before entering a mix-zone and a pseudonym observed
after exiting the mix-zone. Thus the overall goal of the
adversary is to track the whereabouts of the user by tracking
the mappings between the old and new pseudonyms at
various mix-zones and by associating a user’s pseudonym
to user’s actual identity through the association of sensitive
locations such as home address or office building of the
same user. The goal of users is to change pseudonyms
periodically and achieve unlinkability between their old
and new pseudonyms so that they can remain anonymous.
We therefore consider an adversary is successful if the
correct mapping between a new and old pseudonym can
be established in a mix-zone.
We describe three types of attacks based on the character-
istics of road networks: (1) Timing Attacks, (2) Transition
Attacks and (3) Combined Timing and Transition Attacks.
Timing Attack: In timing attack, the attacker observes
the time of entry, tin(i) and time of exit tout(i) for each
user entering and exiting the mix-zone. When the attacker
sees an user i0 exiting, he tries to map i0 to one of the
users of the anonymity set, Ai. The attacker assigns a
4probability, pi0!j that corresponds to the probability of
mapping i0 to j, where j 2 A. The mapping probabilities
are computed through inference based on the likelihoods
of the rest of the users to exit at the exit time of i0,
denoted by tout(i0). Once the mapping probabilities are
computed, the attacker can utilize the skewness in the
distribution of the mapping probabilities to eliminate some
low probable mappings from consideration and narrow
down his inference to only the high probable mappings.
Consider an example anonymity set, A = fa; b; cg, let
user a exit with a new pseudonym a0 at tout(a0) and let
the likelihoods of a; b and c exiting at time tout(a0) be
0.1, 0.09 and 0.05 respectively. In this case, we show that
it is easy to compute the mapping probabilities based on
these likelihoods: pa0!a = 0:10:1+0:09+0:05 = 0:416, pa0!b =
0:09
0:1+0:09+0:05 = 0:375 and pa0!c =
0:05
0:1+0:09+0:05 = 0:208.
Thus, with the timing information, the attacker is able to
find that a0 ! a is the most probable mapping and a0 ! c
is least probable. Such timing attack can be detrimental if
not handled appropriately in the mix-zone construction and
usage model.
Transition Attack: In transition attack, the attacker es-
timates the transition probability for each possible turn
in the intersection based on previous observations. On
seeing an exiting user, i0, the attacker assigns the map-
ping probability pi0!j for each j 2 A based on the
conditional transitional probabilities T ((iseg(i); oseg(i0))
and T ((iseg(j); oseg(i0)). Recall, T ((iseg(j); oseg(i0))
denotes the conditional probability of an user i0 entering
through the entry segment, iseg(j) given that the user
exited at the segment, oseg(i0). The mapping probabilities,
pi0!i and pi0!j under the transition attack are therefore
given by
pi0!i =
T (iseg(i); oseg(i0))
T (iseg(i); oseg(i0)) + T (iseg(j); oseg(i0))
and
pi0!j =
T (iseg(j); oseg(i0))
T (iseg(i); oseg(i0)) + T (iseg(j); oseg(i0))
Transition attack can equally affect the effectiveness of
road network mix-zones as timing attack if not handled
with care.
Combined Timing and Transition Attack: In the com-
bined timing and transition attack model, the attacker is
aware of both the entry and exit timing of the users and as
well the transition probabilities at the road intersection for a
given road network mix-zone. The attacker can estimate the
mapping probabilities pi0!j for each j 2 A based on both
the likelihoods of every user j exiting at time tout(i0) and
the conditional transition probabilities T (iseg(j); oseg(i0)).
3.3 Evaluation Metrics
In this subsection, we discuss the set of metrics used by
MobiMix and their suitability for measuring the anonymity
of road network mix-zones.
Anonymity set size: The size of the anonymity set is the
most straight-forward measure of anonymity. However, this
metric alone is insufficient given the mapping probabilities
may not be uniform in a road network mix-zone. Unlike
an ideal mix-zone, in a road network mix-zone the attacker
can identify which members are low-probable. Here, the
low probable mappings do not effectively count for the
anonymity. When the mapping probability distribution is
not uniform, there can be attacks based on probability
analysis [6], [7], [10]. In other words, we can not say that
a road intersection performs as a good mix-zone just by
the mere fact that the anonymity set size is greater than k.
A number of users in the anonymity set can become low
probable under timing and transition attacks and will not
effectively count towards anonymity.
Entropy: An alternate measure of anonymity would be
based on Entropy that captures the attacker’s uncertainty in
guessing the mapping between a new and old pseudonym
[8], [9], [6], [7], [10]. However, entropy of a user is a
measure over all members of the anonymity set. Therefore it
may not effectively capture the cases where there are a few
skewed mapping probabilities and a large number of non-
skewed mapping probabilities. In such cases, a few high
probable mappings can significantly increase the attacker’s
success of guessing the correct pseudonym mapping even
though the entropy value may be high. In such cases, a
significant part of the entropy could be contributed by a
large number of non-skewed mapping probabilities leading
to a high value of entropy. Hence, we cannot consider that a
mix-zone provides good anonymity for a user if its entropy
is greater than a certain value. Two systems can be shown to
have the same entropy but however provide different levels
of anonymity [10]. Therefore, the entropy measure may
not be used as an accurate estimation of the privacy when
the mapping probabilities are non-uniform [10] as in our
road network mix-zone case.
Normalized Entropy: Normalized entropy, also called
Degree of Entropy, is defined as the ratio of the en-
tropy obtained from the road network mix-zone to the
entropy obtained from a theoretical mix-zone with the same
anonymity set. In other words, it is a measure of how
close is the entropy of the roadnet mix-zone compared
to a theoretical mix-zone. As entropy itself is a measure
over all members of the anonymity set, comparing the
entropy of the realistic mix-zone with the theoretical mix-
zone also may not accurately capture the non-uniformity in
the mapping probability distribution. It can be shown that
there are still cases, such as when the normalized entropy is
close to 1 but the mapping probabilities significantly deviate
from the others [10].
Pairwise Entropy: In order to ensure that the distribution
of the mapping probabilities does not deviate much from
the uniform distribution, we argue that it is important to
measure the deviation of the mapping probabilities in a
pairwise fashion. Pairwise entropy between two users i and
j is the entropy obtained by considering i and j to be the
only members of the anonymity set. In that case, we have
two events: the event of i exiting as i0 and the event of j
exiting as j0. For the first event, we have only two mapping
probabilities: pi0!i and pi0!j . If the probabilities pi0!i and
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attacker has the lowest certainty of linking the outgoing
user i0 to i or j (50%). However, if one of the probabilities
is much larger than the other, then the new pseudonym i0
is more likely to be associated with one of the two old
pseudonyms with high certainty (> 50%) by eliminating
the low probable one. In comparison, by Definition 1, a
theoretical mix-zone ensures a uniform distribution for all
possible mappings between old and new pseudonyms and
a high pairwise entropy of 1.0 for all pairs of users in
the anonymity set. If the pairwise entropy, H(i; j) between
users i and j when i exits as i0 is close to 1, it means
that the attacker will have a high uncertainty similar to that
of an ideal mix-zone in guessing the old pseudonym of i0.
However, the attacker also has another event namely the
exit of j as j0. If this event leaks information, with a low
pairwise entropy,H(j; i), for instance if one of the mapping
probabilities, pj0!i and pj0!j is significantly different from
the other, the attacker will be able to identify the old
pseudonym of j0. Consequently the attacker can also guess
the old pseudonym of i0 as i0 and j0 are mutually exclusive
events. Therefore, both the pairwise entropies, H(i; j) and
H(j; i) need to be close to 1. Hence, the effective pairwise
entropy between users i and j can be assumed as the
minimum of the two pairwise entropiesH(i; j) andH(j; i).
An ideal mix-zone provides a pairwise entropy of 1.0
for all pairs of users. We argue that an effective mix-
zone should provide a pairwise entropy close to 1.0 for
all possible pairs of users in the anonymity set. In general
if there are k members in the anonymity set, then it requires
that the pairwise entropy for all k2 possible pairs of users
in the anonymity set is close to 1.0.
Relative Anonymity: The relative anonymity level is a
measure of the level of anonymity provided by the mix-
zones, normalized by the level of anonymity required by
the users. Higher relative anonymity levels mean that, on
the average, users get anonymized with larger k values than
the system-specified minimum k-anonymity levels.
Success Rate: The success rate measures the ratio of the
number of times users obtain anonymity equal or greater
than the system-specified minimum k-anonymity levels.
A good mix-zone should provide anonymization with a
success rate close to 100%.
3.4 Road Network Mix-zone Model
In this section, we present the MobiMix model for road
network mix-zones and discuss the level of anonymity
offered in terms of pairwise entropy and the anonymity
set size, k. We model the road network as a directed graph
G = (VG; EG) where the node set VG represents the road
junctions and the edge set EG represents the road segments
connecting the junctions. In this work, we consider only the
road junctions that connect three or more road segments
as candidate junctions for mix-zones. Consider a mix-zone
constructed at a road intersection v as shown in Figure 1(c).
Assume that each user i enters the mix-zone at time tin(i)
and exits at time tout(i) with a new pseudonym i0. Let
iseg(i) denote the incoming segment of user i through
which i enters the mix-zone, oseg(i) denote the outgoing
road segment of user i through which i leaves the mix-zone.
The speed followed by the users in a road segment follows
a Gaussian distribution as empirically verified in [24], [25],
[26] with a mean  and standard deviation , where  and
 are specific to each road class category. For user i, the
set of all other users who had entered the mix-zone during
the time window defined by tin(i)   to tin(i)+  , forms
the anonymity set of i, denoted as Ai where  is a small
value.
We first derive the pairwise entropy corresponding to user
i and its anonymity set Ai under timing attack. Then, we
discuss the anonymity obtained under transition attack. We
define di(i) as the distance travelled by i inside the mix-
zone. It is the sum of the lengths of the mix-zone regions
on the incoming and exiting segments, iseg(i) and oseg(i).
di(j) is defined as the distance that j needs to travel inside
the mix-zone if it were to exit on the outgoing segment of
i namely oseg(i) instead of its actual outgoing segment,
oseg(j). di(j) is the sum of the lengths of the mix-zone
regions on the segments, iseg(j) and oseg(i). If liseg(i)
and loseg(i) represent the lengths of the mix-zone on the
incoming and outgoing segments of i, then di(i) is given
by
di(i) = liseg(i) + loseg(i)
Similarly,
di(j) = liseg(j) + loseg(i)
Let speedi and speedj denote the random variables of the
speed of users i and j. As the speed is assumed to follow
a Gaussian distribution, the variables speedi and speedj
become Normal variables. We also assume that time is
slotted and let t be the time of exit of user i, that is
tout(i). Let pi0!j be the probability that the exiting user i0
is j and pi0!i be the probability that the exiting user is i.
Users i and j become anonymous from each other if the
probability, pi0!j is exactly equal to the probability, pi0!i
which happens when users i and j enter the mix-zone at
the same time and travel the same distance to exit the mix-
zone. In short, the more one of these probabilities differs
from the other, the higher confidence the attacker will have
in linking the old and new pseudonyms.
Let P (j; t) denote the likelihood that user j exits the mix-
zone in the time interval, t to t + 1 where the pair (j; t)
is a random variable and P (j; t) numerically equals to the
probability that user j takes time in the interval (t tin(j))
to (t+1  tin(j)) to travel the distance di(j). Accordingly,
j needs to travel with an average speed in the range s1 =
di(j)
(t tin(j)) to s2 =
di(j)
(t+1 tin(j)) in order to exit during the
time interval between t to t+ 1. Therefore, we have
P (j; t) =
Z s1
s2
P (speedj = s)ds
Similarly,
P (i; t) =
Z s1
s2
P (speedi = s)ds
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di(i)
(t tin(i)) to s2 =
di(i)
(t+1 tin(i)) and
P (speedj = s) denotes the probability that speedj = s.
If P (i0; t) represents the likelihood that some user i0
exits at time t to t + 1, where i0 can be either of i or j
and the pair (i0; t) is a random variable, we have
P (i0; t) = P (i; t) + P (j; t)
Therefore, applying Bayes’ Theorem, the probability of i0
being j when i0 exits at time t, denoted as pi0!j(t) is given
by
pi0!j(t) = P ((j; t)j(i0; t)) = P ((i
0; t)j(j; t)) P (j; t)
(i0; t)
Here P ((i0; t)j(j; t)) = 1, as P (j; t) is contained in P (i0; t).
Therefore
pi0!j(t) =
P (j; t)
P (i0; t)
Similarly, the probability of i0 being i, pi0!i(t) is given by
pi0!i(t) = P ((i; t)j(i0; t)) = P (i; t)
P (i0; t)
The pair-wise entropy between users i and j when i exits
as i0 is given by
Hpair(i; j; t) =  (pi0!i(t)logpi0!i(t)+pi0!j(t)logpi0!j(t))
Similarly, the pair-wise entropy between users i and j when
j exits as j0 is given by
Hpair(j; i; t) =  (pj0!i(t)logpj0!i(t)+pj0!j(t)logpj0!j(t))
Here, we notice that even though when i0 exits, it might
resemble both i and j with a closely equal probability and
a high pairwise entropy, Hpair(i; j; t), when user j0 exits,
it might reveal that j0 is more likely to be one of i and
j than the other as these are mutually exclusive events.
Therefore, although the pair-wise entropy between i and j,
Hpair(i; j; t) may be close to 1 when i0 exits, it may happen
that the pair-wise entropy of j, Hpair(j; i; tout(j0)) when
j0 exits is well below 1. Hence, it is important that both
of the two pair-wise entropies are high enough to make
the attacker harder to guess the mapping. Therefore, the
effective pairwise entropy of users i and j is given by the
minimum of the two pairwise entropies, Hpair(i; j; tout(i0))
and Hpair(j; i; tout(j0))
Hpair(i; j) = minfHpair(i; j; tout(i0));Hpair(j; i; tout(j0))g
Also, we find that the pairwise entropy is a function of the
exit time, t of i0. As the exit time depends on the time
spent inside the mix-zone which is inversely proportional
to the speed of the user inside the mix-zone, the pairwise
entropy becomes a function of the speed of the user inside
the mix-zone. A good mix-zone should offer high pairwise
entropy for a wide range of user speeds, for example, say
0 to 90 mph on a highway road and 0 to 40 mph on a
residential road. The lowest pairwise entropy offered by
the mix-zone within this speed range would define the
lowerbound pairwise entropy of the mix-zone. A good mix-
zone should therefore offer a high lowerbound,  on the
pairwise entropy for a wide range of user speeds.
We now extend our discussion with the pairwise entropy
under transition attack. Based on the transition probabilities
of the road junction, let T (segl; segm) be the conditional
transition probability computed by the attacker on exit of
i0. T (segl; segm) represents the conditional probability of
user i0 entering through an incoming segment segl given
that i0 exited on the outgoing segment segm. The mapping
probabilities, pi0!i and pi0!j under the transition attack
are therefore given by
pi0!i =
T (iseg(i); oseg(i0))
T (iseg(i); oseg(i0)) + T (iseg(j); oseg(i0))
and
pi0!j =
T (iseg(j); oseg(i0))
T (iseg(i); oseg(i0)) + T (iseg(j); oseg(i0))
Hence, the pairwise entropy under transition attack will be
Hpair(i; j) =  (pi0!ilogpi0!i + pi0!j logpi0!j)
In order for the mix-zone to be resilient to transition attacks,
the mix-zone should offer a high lowerbound,  on the
pairwise entropy after transition attack for all pairs of users
in the anonymity set.
Next, we define the criteria for a roadnet mix-zone to
function as an effective mix-zone based on the lowerbounds
 and  on the pairwise entropies after timing and transition
attacks.
Definition 2: A road network mix-zone offers k-
anonymity to a set A of users if and only if the following
conditions are met:
1) There are k or more users in the anonymity set A.
2) Given any two users i; j 2 A and assuming i exiting
at time t, the pairwise entropy after timing attack
should satisfy the condition: Hpair(i; j; t)  .
3) For any two users i; j 2 A, the pairwise entropy
after transition attack should meet the condition:
Hpair(i; j)  .
In the next section, we present our proposed techniques
and approaches to construct road network mix-zones that
effectively satisfy the above conditions.
4 MIX-ZONE CONSTRUCTION
We compare and analyze the effectiveness of the MobiMix
mix-zone construction approaches against timing attack and
discuss how the mix-zone geometry and road characteristics
impact on the attack-resilience.
4.1 Construction Approaches
We first describe the weaknesses of the naive rectan-
gular mix-zone approach and then propose three Mo-
biMix mix-zone construction techniques taking into con-
sideration the geometry of the zones and their impact
on the resilience to timing attack. We propose: (i) Time
Window Bounded(TWB) Rectangular, (ii) Time Window
Bounded(TWB) Shifted Rectangular and (iii) Time Window
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Bounded(TWB) Non-rectangular mix-zones. All perform
better than the naive Rectangular mix-zones under timing
attack.
4.1.1 Naive Rectangular Mix-zones
A straight forward approach to construct mix-zones around
the road junction is to define a rectangular region centered
at the road junction as shown in Figure 2(a). The rectangle
is defined based on some default size. For each exiting
user i0, the set of users that were inside the mix-zone at
any given time during user i0’s presence in the mix-zone
forms its anonymity set, Ai. Here, any two users that were
present together at any same given time, become members
of each other’s anonymity sets.
4.1.2 TWB Rectangular Mix-zones
In the time window bounded approach, the rectangle is
constructed in the same way as in naive rectangular mix-
zone, however, the anonymity set for each user, i is assumed
to comprise of users who had entered within a time window
in the interval, jtin(i)   1j to jtin(i) + 2j. Here, tin(i)
is the arrival time of user i and 1 and 2 are chosen to
be small values so that the time window ensures that the
anonymity set of i comprises only of the users entering
the mix-zone with a closely similar arrival time as that
of i. The goal of the mix-zone construction is to ensure
high pairwise entropy for every pair of users entering
within the time window. We would like to note that the
anonymity guarantee made by the mix-zone is by design a
lower bound on the anonymity observed by the adversary
for two reasons. First, we argue that a good anonymity
system should anonymize users in such a way that there is
similar probability of mapping the actual subject to all the
other users in the anonymity set. Thus, by discarding the
low probable mappings and the corresponding users from
the guaranteed anonymity set, we get an estimate of the
number of users whose mapping probability distribution
closely resembles a uniform distribution. Thus we get a
measure of the number of users to belong to the anonymity
set in such a way that they get anonymized in a way very
similar to that of an ideal system. For road intersections
that have segments with the same speed distribution, we can
precisely guarantee a lowerbound on the pairwise entropy
for the members of the anonymity set by constructing
the anonymity set with the right value of time window
based on our MobiMix road network model. Although,
the notion of mix-zone time window has been adopted
in existing mix-zone proposals [11], [13] where a default
value of time window is assumed for the junctions, the
TWB rectangular approach decides the right size of the time
window based on the arrival rate of users so that k or more
users enter within the time window. Also as mentioned
earlier, for road intersections that have road segments with
same speed distribution, we can guarantee a lowerbound
pairwise entropy based on the Mobimix model for each
pair of users entering with the time bound window. But
for the sake of our experimental comparisons, we consider
TWB rectangular mix-zones as the candidate mix-zone for
comparison with the existing mix-zones proposed in [11].
4.1.3 TWB Shifted Rectangular Mix-zones
In the Time window bounded shifted rectangular approach,
the rectangle is not centered at the centre of the junction,
instead it is shifted in such a way that from any point of
entry into the mix-zone, it takes the same amount of time
to reach the centre of the road junction when travelled at
the mean speed as shown in Figure 2(b). In the same way,
from the centre of the junction, it takes the same time to
reach any exit point when travelling at the mean speed of
the road segments. Here, a set of users entering within the
short time window, jtin(i)   1j to jtin(i) + 2j are likely
to exit the mix-zone at the same time. Hence, when user i
exits as i0 the attacker would find that i0 is likely to be any
of the members of the anonymity set, Ai. If t represents
the average time to reach the centre of the road junction
from an entry point which is the same as the average time
to reach an exit point from the junction center, then the
mix-zone lengths on the segments would be given by the
product of their mean speed, say v and the average time, t
as shown in 2(b). Compared to naive rectangular and time
window bounded rectangular mix-zones, shifted rectangular
mix-zones provide good pairwise entropy for many cases,
however, they do leak information when the speed of the
users deviate from the mean speed resulting in a weaker
anonymity system [6], [7], [10]. Another limitation of this
approach is that it may not be possible to satisfy the shifted
rectangle property if the road segments are not orthogonal.
Hence, this approach is limited to only road junctions with
orthogonal segments.
84.1.4 TWB Non-Rectangular mix-zones
A more effective way to construct mix-zones would be
to have the mix-zone region start from the centre of the
junction only on the outgoing road segments as shown in
Figure 2(c). We refer to this technique as non-rectangular
approach. The non-rectangular approach is free from timing
attacks caused by the heterogeneity in the speed distribution
on the road segments. As in the rectangular approaches, the
anonymity set for each user, i comprises of users who had
entered the mix-zone within a time window in the interval,
jtin(i)   1j to jtin(i) + 2j. The length of the mix-zone
along each outgoing segment is chosen based on the mean
speed of the road segment, the size of the chosen time
window and the minimum pairwise entropy required. We
discuss details on computing the mix-zone size and time
window in section 4.4.
4.2 Timing Attack Analysis
In this sub-section, we analyze the privacy strengths of
the proposed mix-zone approaches under timing attack and
compare their attack-resilience.
4.2.1 Naive Rectangular Mix-zones
Timing attacks are highly effective in Naive rectangular
Mix-zones. In Naive Rectangular mix-zones, although the
anonymity set size is typically large, a large number of
members of the anonymity set become low probable under
the timing attack. For instance, in Figure 2(a), consider two
users i and j entering from the segments a into the mix-
zone. Let user i exit with a new pseudonym i0 on segment
c and let us assume the four road segments in the mix-
zone, a, b, c and d have the same speed distribution. If the
arrival times of i and j differ by a large value, then although
users i and j might have been present together in the mix-
zone for some amount of time, the attacker might infer that
the user who entered first is more likely to exit first and
that it is unlikely for j to have overtaken i before i exits
the mix-zone. Therefore, the pairwise entropy of the naive
rectangular mix-zones is low under timing attack, leaking
more information to aid the attacker.
4.2.2 TWB Rectangular Mix-zones
TWB rectangular mix-zones have high resilience to timing
attack in road junctions that have segments with the same
speed distribution as the members of its anonymity set have
similar time of arrival into the mix-zone. However, when
the segments of the road intersection have different mean
speeds, for instance if they belong to different road classes,
the attacker may be able to eliminate some mappings
based on the timing information. For example, in Figure
2(a), let us assume a mix-zone of size 0.5 miles  0.5
miles with segments a and c of residential road category
having a mean speed of 20 mph and segments b and d
of highway roads with a mean speed 60 mph. Consider
two users i and j entering the mix-zone at the same time.
Let user i enter through the highway segment b and exit
through the highway segment d and let user j enter though
the residential segment a and exit through the residential
segment c. If both i and j travel around the mean speed
of their respective road segments, then i and j would exit
approximately in 30 seconds and 90 seconds respectively.
When user i exits out with a changed pseudonym i0 in
30 seconds, the attacker can infer that i0 is more likely to
be i than j. Thus, even though the anonymity set consists
of users entering with closely similar arrival time, the
differences in the speed distribution on the roads leaks
information to aid the timing attack.
4.2.3 TWB Shifted Rectangular Mix-zones
TWB shifted rectangular mix-zones are resilient to timing
attacks even on road junctions that have segments with
different mean speeds provided the users travel at the mean
speed of the segments. However, they are also prone to
timing attack when the speed of the users deviate from
the mean speed of the road segments. For example, in
Figure 2(b), consider a mix-zone of size 0.5 miles X 0.5
miles in a road intersection with a slow residential road
segment, a having mean speed 20 mph and three other
highway segments, b, c, and d having mean speed 60 mph.
Let all road segments have a standard deviation of 10
mph from their mean speed. The computation would yield
va:t = 0:375 miles and vb:t = vc:t = vd:t = 0:125 miles.
Let users i and j enter the mix-zone at the same time.
Let user i enter through the highway segment, b and exit
through the highway segment, d and let j enter through the
residential road segment, a and exit through the highway
segment, c. Let us assume user j travels with a speed of
10 mph on segment a and travels at 60 mph on segment, c.
In this case, the attacker would see j0 exiting in 2 minutes,
32.5 seconds. With this timing information, the attacker
can find that j0 is more likely to be mapped to j than i
because if j0 is i, then i should have travelled really slow
on the highway segments b and c, with an average speed
of 5.9 mph in order to exit after 2 minutes, 32.5 seconds.
However, if j0 is j, then j needs to have travelled only at
10 mph on the residential road segment, a which is more
likely to happen. Thus, the attacker can guess that j0 is j
with high confidence. In general, the shifted rectangular
approach performs badly when the user’s speed deviate
from the mean speed of the road segments.
4.2.4 TWB Non-rectangular Mix-zones
The TWB non-rectangular mix-zone is most resilient to
timing attacks as it does not encounter any disparity in the
speed distributions. Here, as long as a pair of users enter
within each other’s time window, the attacker can not infer
the correct pseudonym mappings if the length of the mix-
zone is sufficiently large for the chosen time window. In
the next subsection, we compare the effectiveness of these
mix-zone approaches.
4.2.5 Pairwise Analysis
In order to better understand the effect of timing at-
tack on guessing the mapping between the old and new
pseudonyms, we perform a pairwise analysis considering
only two users in the mix-zones. We compare the effec-
tiveness of the different approaches in Figure 3. As an
example, we consider a mix-zone of length 400 meter in a
road junction that has two highway road segments where
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Fig. 3: Effectiveness of Mix-zones against timing attack.
the speed is normally distributed with 60 mph mean and
20 mph standard deviation and 2 residential road segments
where the speed is distributed with 25 mph mean and
10 mph standard deviation. For a rectangular and shifted
rectangular mix-zone, the mix-zone length corresponds to
the longer side of the rectangle and for the non-rectangular
mix-zone, the mix-zone length refers to the length of the
longest mix-zone region on the outgoing road segments.
In this pairwise analysis, for the rectangular mix-zones, the
breadth is also taken as 400 meter. We consider two users i
and j and measure the worst case and average case pairwise
entropies. User i travels on the fast highway segments
and user j travels on the slow residential segments. The
worst case typically represents the arrival times of i and j
separated by the maximum possible value defined by the
mix-zone time window. Here the mix-zone time window is
taken as 4 sec for the example mix-zone considered. The
average case represents the case where the arrival times of
i and j are separated by half the size of the time window,
namely 2 sec. User i changes its pseudonym to i0 and the X-
axis shows the average speed followed by the exiting user,
i0 inside the mix-zone and the Y-axis shows the worst case
and average case pairwise entropies. We find that both the
naive rectangular approach and the time window bounded
rectangular approach have low pairwise entropy for both
the worst case and average case for speeds even close to
60 mph, the mean speed of the highway segments that
i travelled. Interestingly, the TWB rectangular approach
shows higher pairwise entropy when user i0 travels slow
on its highway segments. This is because, if i0 travels
slow on the highway segments, then its exit time would
resemble that of j much better as j is travelling on a
slow residential segment. Similarly, the shifted rectangular
approach shows good pairwise entropy when the speed
of i0 is close to the mean speed, 60 mph. However, its
pairwise entropy drops when the speed of i0 deviates from
its mean speed. Outperforming all these approaches, the
TWB non-rectangular approach has a very steady high
pairwise entropy for a wide range of speeds of i0. This
is because, in this mix-zone geometry, users travel only on
one segment in the mix-zone and thereby do not encounter
any disparity in the speed distributions and therefore it is
the most resilient geometry for timing attack.
4.3 Transition Attack Analysis
We now analyze the impact of transition attack that can be
launched to guess the mapping between the pseudonyms.
For each exiting user, i0 the attacker observes the exiting
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Fig. 4: Countering Transition Attack
segment of i0 and tries to map i0 to one of the users, j
in the anonymity set based on the conditional transitional
probability of exiting in the outgoing segment, oseg(i0)
given that j entered from the incoming segment, iseg(j).
We refer the interested readers to Appendix D for an
experimental study on the significance of the transition
attack on the road map of the NW Atlanta region of
Georgia.
In order to protect against transition attack in cases
where the transition probability is skewed, the mix-zone
time window should be chosen in such a way that for each
outgoing segment, l, there are enough number of users (k
or more) entering the mix-zone from the road segments
that have similar transitioning probability to the outgoing
segment, l, and hence have a higher pairwise entropy, say
greater than or equal to . Therefore, the attacker will have
at least k users in the anonymity set that he cannot ignore
from consideration.
Figure 4 shows a TWB non-rectangular mix-zone
with 3 incoming segments, u; v; w and three outgoing
segments, r; y; z. Let T (u; y) be the conditional
probability of an user entering the junction through
segment u given that the user exited on segment y. The
attacker assigns probability pi0!j to each of the users
fa1; a2; a3; :::ak1; b1; b2; b3; :::bk2; c1; c2; c3; :::ck3g based
on the conditional transition probabilities T (u; y), T (v; y),
T (w; y). Assume the conditional transition probability
T (u; y) is too small compared to T (v; y) and T (w; y)
and let the probabilities T (v; y) and T (w; y) be similar.
Let us assume an user i enters from segment w and exits
in segment y as i0. Here, the attacker may be able to
ignore fc1; c2; c3; :::ck3g from the anonymity set of i0.
However, i0 would have a higher pairwise entropy with
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fa1; a2; a3; :::ak1; b1; b2; b3; :::bk2g. Thus, for outgoing
segment y, if we can ensure that there are always k or
more users entering from the segments v and w, then
for any user, i0 exiting on segment y, the attacker would
be confused to differentiate i0 from at least k other
users that forms the effective anonymity set, A0i. Here it
should be also noted that even though the exit of i0 on
segment y does not leak information, the exit of some
user, say a2 along segment z may leak some information
if the transition probability, T (v; z) is much smaller than
T (w; z). Therefore, the effective anonymity should not
contain those members that exit in a segment where user
i’s probability of exiting is lower as these are mutually
exclusive events.
In the next sub-section, we discuss how to determine the
time window and size of the mix-zone so as to make it
resilient to both timing and transition attacks, yielding a
high lowerbound,  and  on the pairwise entropies after
timing and transition attacks respectively.
4.4 Combination of Timing and Transition attacks
The mix-zone time window directly impacts the number
of users arriving from the various segments and therefore
decides the mix-zone’s resilience to transition attack. Once
the right size of the mix-zone time window is determined
for a specified level of resilience to transition attack in
terms of a high lowerbound,  on the pairwise entropy
after transition attack, we need to determine the length of
the mix-zone for the given time window so as to ensure
a high lowerbound on the pairwise entropy after timing
attack.
According to empirical research on road traffic mod-
eling [37], [38], [39], the user arrival on the road seg-
ments follows a Poisson process. Let l denote the mean
arrival rate on each incoming segment l, x;yL represent
the cumulative mean arrival rate of the users that effec-
tively count towards the anonymity set of an user and
i0 exiting along segment y that entered through segment
x. If Mx;y is a subset of the road segments in the
mix-zone, we have x;yL =
P
l2Mx;yjHy
pair(l;x)
>(l  P
zj9m2Mx;y;Hz
pair(m;l)
< T (l; z)l). It is the sum of the
arrival rate of the segments such that the members have
high pairwise entropy with each other and with i0 during
the exit of i0 in segment y. Note that it excludes among the
users who entered from segment, l, those that would exit
in some segment, z where the conditional probability of
exiting in z is significantly different. Here Mx;y is chosen
as that subset of the road segments that maximizes x;yL . If
N(t) represents the number of users who had entered the
mix-zone at time t since the beginning, then the probability
of having n users enter during a short time window, x;y
is given by
P [N(t+ x;y) N(t) = n] = e
 x;yL x;y (x;yL 
x;y)n
n!
N(t + x;y)   N(t) would represent the number of users
arrived within the short time interval, x;y. The probability
that k or more users enter the mix-zone in the time window,
x;y is
P [(N(t+x;y) N(t)  k] = 1 
X
1nk
e 
x;y
L 
x;y
(x;yL 
x;y)n
n!
By adjusting the size of the time window, x;y , we can
lowerbound the number of users arriving from the segments
whose conditional probability of exiting in segment y is
similar to that of users from segment x. For instance, we
may choose the time window, x;y such that there are k = 5
or more users entering with a high probability, say p = 0:9.
The overall time window,  of the mix-zone is given by the
maximum value of x;y among the various segments, y in
the road junction.
 = max
y
x;y
Once the value of  is decided, we determine the length
of the mix-zone so that the mix-zone provides a high
lowerbound,  on the pairwise entropy after timing attack
for a wide range of user speeds. For example, we might
want a lowerbound pairwise entropy of  = 0:9 for a wide
range of users’ speed, say 0 mph to 90 mph. Our algorithm
iteratively increments the length of the mix-zone till the
expected lowerbound on the pairwise entropy is met for
the chosen time window,  . In this context, we note that
except for the TWB non-rectangular mix-zones, the other
approaches suffer from timing attacks and hence it is not
possible to have a time window and mix-zone length for
them to ensure a high lowerbound on the pairwise entropy.
However, the TWB non-rectangular mix-zones offer high
lowerbounds even for small mix-zone lengths. As we have
a lower bound on the pair-wise entropy and a lower bound
on k, the number of users, the mix-zone can now make
probabilistic guarantees on the anonymity provided.
5 MIX-ZONE PLACEMENT
In this section, we present the mix-zone placement algo-
rithms that find the best set of road intersections to function
as mix-zones based on the user arrival rates, statistics of
user movements, road network topology and road charac-
teristics in terms of mean user speeds and the temporal
and spatial resolution of location exposure. Although in-
dividual mix-zones are efficient with respect to providing
the required level of anonymity, careful deployment on
the road is crucial to ensure good cumulative anonymity
for users as they traverse through multiple mix-zones on
their trajectories. Mix-zones placed too far from each other
may lead to longer distances between adjacent mix-zones
in users’ trajectories. On the other hand, if mix-zones are
placed too close to one another, users may go through mix-
zones more frequently than necessary. An optimal solution
to the mix-zone placement problem is NP-complete for
even small road networks [12]. Thus we use a heuristic-
based placement approach in MobiMix. A good placement
algorithm should (i) provide sufficient anonymity in each
of the mix-zones (ii) ensure that users go through sufficient
number of mix-zones along their path to the destination
and (iii) minimize the total number of mix-zones in the
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system, thereby minimizing the overall cost of the privacy
protection. A naive placement strategy is to randomly select
a subset of road junctions with three or more road segments.
A better strategy is to place mix-zones at intersections
that have high density of traffic and low skewness in the
transition probability distribution. We call this approach the
road-aware top n placement. An alternative approach is
the grid-based quadtree placement strategy, which divides a
road-network into grid cells using quadtree index partition
and maximizes the average distance between any pair of
mix-zones within each quadrant (grid cell). Due to space
constraint, we omit the design detail of these mix-zone
placement algorithms in the paper and refer readers to
Appendix B for further detail.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We divide the experimental evaluation of MobiMix into
three components: (i) the effectiveness of our mix-zone
construction approaches in terms of their resilience to
timing and transition attacks and comparison with existing
naive mix-zone approaches (ii) their performance in terms
of success rate and relative anonymity levels and (iii) the
effectiveness of the mix-zone placement algorithms in terms
of overall cumulative anonymity, mix-zone size and spatial
uniformity of placement. Before reporting our experimental
results, we first briefly describe the experimental setup.
6.1 Experimental setup
We use the GT Mobile simulator [19] to generate a trace of
10000 cars moving on a real-world road network, obtained
from maps available at the National Mapping Division of
the USGS [3]. By default we use the map of Northwest
Atlanta region of Georgia that has 6831 road intersections
with 10000 mobile users. We refer the readers to Ap-
pendix C for a detailed description of the experimental
setup including the realistic mobility model used in the
experiments.
6.2 Experimental results
Our experimental evaluation consists of three parts. First,
we evaluate the effectiveness of the mix-zone construction
algorithms by measuring their attack resilience to timing
and transition attacks. We then evaluate the effectiveness
of the mix-zones in terms of the success rate in providing
the desired value of k and study the relative anonymity
level which is defined as the ratio of the obtained value
of k to the expected value of k: We observe how these
parameters behave when we vary the settings of a number
of parameters, such as the expected value of k, the expected
probability of success, p. Our final set of experiments evalu-
ates the performance of the mix-zone placement algorithms
in terms of the overall cumulative anonymity of the users,
average mix-zone size and spatial uniformity of mix-zone
placement. Our results show that the MobiMix construction
techniques are effective, fast and scalable and outperform
the basic construction methods by a large extent.
6.2.1 Resilience to Timing and Transition Attacks
In our first set of experiments, we analyze the effectiveness
of the mix-zones against timing, transition and combined
attacks. The description of the road map used for this set
of experiments is described in appendix C. Out of the
6831 road junctions in the map, more than 2000 candidate
junctions were chosen to build mix-zones based on their
user arrival rate and the number of road segments that
connect to them. Figure 5 shows the average pairwise
entropy of the mix-zones for various values of k, the size
of the anonymity set. We observe that the pairwise entropy
after transition attack is low in the naive rectangular mix-
zone compared to the other MobiMix approaches as the
MobiMix mix-zones are protected for transition attack with
their anonymity sets consisting of only members that have
high pairwise entropy to each other. The effect of timing
attack is different across various approaches: we find that
the TWB non-rectangular mix-zones perform the best under
timing attack with the average pairwise entropy close to
1.0. Here, the length of the non-rectangular mix-zone is
computed so as to ensure a lowerbound pairwise entropy
of  = 0:9 for the chosen time window size,  which is
computed based on the user arrival rate in the road junction
to ensure the expected value of k with a high probability
of p = 0.9. However, as discussed in section 4.2.5, it is
not possible to lowerbound the pairwise entropy for the
other mix-zone approaches. Hence, in order to compare
the effectiveness of these approaches with the TWB non-
rectangular approach, we construct the TWB rectangular
and TWB shifted rectangular mix-zones with the same
length and time window as used by the non-rectangular
mix-zone. Similarly, the size of the naive rectangular mix-
zone is fixed in such a way that the mean time to cross
the mix-zone equals the time window of the TWB non-
rectangular mix-zone. In Figure 5, we also find that the
naive rectangular and time window bounded rectangular
mix-zones have low pairwise entropies after timing attack
but the pairwise entropy of the TWB shifted rectangular
approach is relatively higher, close to 0.8 as it’s geometry
is more resilient to timing attack. However, a high pairwise
entropy of 0.9 or higher may be often required to ensure
strong anonymity. In such cases, the time window bounded
rectangular approach becomes the most efficient approach.
Additionally, in the figure, we find that the effect of
combined timing and transition attack is at least as severe
as either of these attacks in isolation and it gets worse in
naive rectangular mix-zones which is least resilient to both
timing and transition attacks.
Similarly, Figure 6 shows the comparison of the worst
case pairwise entropy after timing attack for various mix-
zones. The worst case pairwise entropy represents the
lowest possible pairwise entropy obtained by the users after
timing attack. Here also, only the TWB non-rectangular
approach offers a high value for the worst case pairwise
entropy. The other approaches in their bad cases leak a
lot information to aid the attacker. We also compare the
overall entropy under attacks for various values of k in
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Fig. 5: Average Pairwise Entropy after Attacks
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Fig. 7: Comparison of Entropy after attacks
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Figure 7 for the same experimental setting and road map
described in appendix C. The overall entropy is computed
by assigning the probability distribution, Pi0 >j for each
user j 2 Ai based on the likelihood of user j to exit at
the exit time of i. The line showing the theoretical value of
entropy corresponds to the actual entropy obtained from an
ideal mix-zone for the same anonymity set as the realistic
mix-zones. We find that the TWB non-rectangular approach
has the highest overall entropy after timing, transition and
combined attacks closely resembling that of a theoretical
mix-zone. We discuss additional results on success rate and
relative anonymity in Appendix D.
6.3 Performance of Placement Techniques
We now study the performance of the various mix-zone
placement algorithms in terms of the mix-zone size, spatial
uniformity of placement, the average number of mix-zones
traversed by the mobile clients and the entropy obtained
during user’s travel with the three mix-zone placement
algorithms namely (i) Naive placement (ii) top-n (user
and road characteristics-aware) placement and (iii) Grid
(Quadree) based network-aware placement. The experiment
uses the NW atlanta region map that contains 6831 road
junctions, out of which the placement algorithms chooses
7% of the road intersections for deploying mix-zones that
corresponds to 478 road junctions. The experiment uses a
10 minute simulation period. Figure 8(a) shows the cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF) of the users in percentage
for various number of mix-zones traversed during their trip.
We find that users traverse less number of mix-zones in the
naive mix-zone deployment scheme. We find more than
60% of the users traverse less than 10 mix-zones during
their entire 10 minute travel. The top-n (user and road
characteristics-aware) placement scheme enables users to
pass through higher number of mix-zones as it basically
finds all the intersections that have dense traffic. Here, users
go through more number of mix-zones in short intervals
of distance which may not be necessary. Such unnecessary
traversal of mix-zones may deteriorate the quality of service
for the mobile clients. In Figure 8(a), we also find that there
is a significant percentage of users traversing less number
of mix-zones. For example, more than 9% of the users
traverse only less than 10 mix-zones during the 10 minute
trajectory. This is due to the non-uniformity in the spatial
distribution of the mix-zones. Hence, users traversing some
part of the road networks go through few mix-zones while
users travelling in other parts unnecessarily go through
many mix-zones. The Grid (Quadree-based network-aware)
deployment ensures a higher level of spatial uniformity in
the distribution of mix-zones. In the Grid approach, we
find that almost all users traverse at least 10 mix-zones
during the 10 minute interval. Also, we find that users do
not unnecessarily traverse many mix-zones, only few users
travel a large number of mix-zones as compared to the top-
n placement scheme.
Figure 8(b) shows the average size of the mix-zone in
meters for values of k. We find that the naive placement
approach leads to larger mix-zone sizes for even small
values of k as it lacks knowledge of the user arrival
rate and user transition probability. Such large mix-zone
size would significantly impact the service quality of the
mobile users. The top-n scheme has the lowest mix-zone
length among the three approaches as it identifies the most
densely populated road junctions where even small mix-
zone sizes yield higher k. However, the Grid placement
scheme is also able to achieve almost similar mix-zone
lengths as the top-n placement as it considers the road
characteristics and user population factors in addition to the
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Fig. 8: Mix-zone Placement
road network-aware spatial uniformity. Figure 8(c) shows
the time line of cumulative entropy. The x-axis shows
the time in seconds and the Y-axis represents the average
cumulative entropy obtained. The naive placement shows
low cumulative entropy, particularly in the beginning of
the timeline (0 to 200 sec). Also, we find that both the top-
n and Grid placements show similar average cumulative
entropy in the beginning of the timeline although the top-
n scheme has higher cumulative entropy at the later part
of the timeline as users go through a large number of
mix-zones with the top-n placement. In order to better
understand the impact of the spatial uniformity of the
mix-zone deployment on the cumulative entropy, in Figure
8(d) we study the cumulative distribution of the users in
percentage for various values of average final cumulative
entropy at the end of the 10 minute interval. It shows a
very similar trend as in Figure 8(a). We find the naive
placement scheme does not achieve high final cumulative
entropy for all users. The top-n scheme has overall higher
final cumulative entropy but has a significantly higher
percentage of users having low final cumulative entropy.
In the Grid approach, almost all users obtain higher final
cumulative entropy and therefore the distribution has low
skewness. Thus, the Grid placement scheme becomes the
most effective choice in deploying mix-zones.
7 RELATED WORK
Anonymization based location privacy research can be
broadly categorized into spatial cloaking with location k-
anonymity guarantee and mix-zones with unlinkability of
old and new pseudonyms.
Spatial cloaking with location k-anonymity has evolved
from uniform k for all mobile users [16] to personalized
k-anonymity [14], [20], [4]. Most recent work on loca-
tion k-anonymity have focused more on travelers on road
networks [21], [23]. XStar [21] performs spatial cloaking
based on road-network-specific privacy and QoS require-
ments, striking a balance between the attack resilience of
the performed protection and the processing cost of the
anonymous queries. Cachecloak [23] uses cache prefetch-
ing to hide the exact location of the user by requesting
the location based data along an entire predicted path.
[33] proposes a collaborating strategy where users can
have their LBS queries answered by nearby peers and
thereby minimize the exposure of location information to
the untrusted LBS. As discussed before, the approaches
based on location cloaking do not work for applications that
require identity or pseudo-identity of mobile users. Also the
existing methods [23], [33] are not suitable for continuous
location query services.
The mix-zone based location privacy research is tar-
geted at protecting location privacy for users who request
continuous location services or LBSs that require pseudo-
identity, such as tracking a taxi cab within 5 miles of my
location. The idea of using mix-zones for location privacy
was introduced in [5] and the idea of building mix-zones
at road intersections were proposed in [11], [13]. [36]
proposes the idea of changing pseudonyms at social spots
(similar to mix-zones) so that users can remain anonymous.
A formulation for optimal placement of mix-zones on a
road map is discussed in [12], which showed that such
optimal placement is NP-hard for even small road networks.
Similarly, [34] presents an optimal solution to the mix-
zone placement problem which is NP-hard and presents
approximations by assuming every road segment has at
least one mix-zone and by relaxing the assumption of non-
uniform traffic and by ignoring road junctions that yield
lower entropy. [35] proposes a game-theoretic approach
to mix-zone placement with the assumption that at least
one end of each road segment has a mix-zone. We note
that most of the existing mix-zone techniques are straight
forward by using rectangular or circular shaped zones and
their construction methodologies do not take into account
the effect of timing attacks and transition attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, MobiMix mix-zones are
the only solutions to date that take into consideration of
timing and transition attacks in its mix-zone constructions.
Thus MobiMix makes a number of original contributions:
First, its mix-zone construction algorithms minimize the
effect of timing and transition attacks based on the charac-
teristics of the underlying road network and guarantee an
expected value of anonymity by incorporating the statistics
of both road network topology and road network traffics.
Second, unlike previous mix-zone placement techniques,
such as [34], [35], which leads to having 50% road junction
as mix-zones, the MobiMix mix-zone placement techniques
are closely integrated with its attack-resilient mix-zone con-
struction methodologies and thereby achieves good privacy
even with as few as 10% mix-zones on the road network.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented MobiMix, a framework for building
attack resilient road network mix-zones for protecting the
location privacy of mobile clients. We highlight that road
network mix-zone construction and placement techniques
should take into consideration a number of factors such
14
as the mix-zone geometry, the statistics of the user pop-
ulation, and the spatial and velocity constraints on the
movement patterns of the users. We show analytically
and experimentally that the MobiMix construction and
placement techniques are efficient and more resilient to
timing and transition attacks than the existing mix-zone
approaches. Our research on MobiMix continues along
several directions, including considering more sophisticated
attack models based on background knowledge about the
users’ trajectory patterns and travel behavior.
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1APPENDIX A
MOBIMIX SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The system architecture of MobiMix consists of following
components (1) MobiMix Anonymizer, (2) Road Network
Monitor, (3) Mix-zone construction modules, (4) Mix-zone
placement and (5) Computing Infrastructure. We describe
each of them below:
A.0.1 Mix-zone Anonymizer
The Mix-zone anonymizer is responsible for anonymizing
the raw location updates received from the mobile clients
before releasing it to the Location Based Service provider
for processing. The anonymizer stores two important in-
formation: (1) Mix-zone-junctions Map that stores which
junctions are presently functioning as mix-zones and (2)
User-pseudonyms Map that stores the mapping between
the user’s real identity and their current pseudonyms. Upon
arrival of a location update from a client, the anonymizer
checks to see if the present location of the client cor-
responds to a mix-zone region. If so, the anonymizer
drops the location update from being sent to the Location-
based service (LBS) provider and denies service to the
mobile client. Also, the mobile user is assigned a new
pseudonym and the corresponding entry is updated in the
User-pseudonym Map. If the mobile user is not currently
inside a mix-zone, then the anonymizer passes the location
update to the LBS server by replacing the real identity of
the user its the current pseudonym.
A.0.2 Road Network Monitor
The road network monitor works closely with the mix-
zone anonymizer. It examines each location update of the
mobile client and monitors the current behaviour of the
road network in terms of the user speeds and their arrival
patterns. It consists of the following sub-components:
Arrival Rate Monitor: The arrival rate monitor observes
the user arrivals in each road junction along each road
segment and identifies the user arrival process and the
associated parameters. It provides the arrival rate parameter
to the mix-zone construction module.
Transition Monitor The transition monitor observes
the transitions taken by the users in each road junction
and computes the transition probabilities for all possible
transitions in the road intersections. This information is
used to compute the conditional transition probabilty in the
attack-resilient mix-zone construction phase.
Road Speed Monitor Based on the location updates
received from the clients, the road speed monitor computes
the current speed of the road segments in terms of the mean
speed and standard deviation. Also, it is aware of the speed
limits of the road segments based on the road category they
belong to.
A.0.3 Mix-zone Construction
The mix-zone construction module consists of the im-
plementation of the MobiMix attack-resilient mix-zone
techniques. It has information about the user arrival rate,
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Fig. 1: MobiMix System Architecture
transition probability in the junctions and speed distribution
in the road segments through the road network monitor.
The mix-zone construction takes into account the effect of
both timing and transition attacks and ensures an expected
number of users in the mix-zone that directly corresponds to
the level of anonymity obtained. The construction module
outputs the mix-zone size and shape for each mix-zone and
also assists the mix-zone placement module to determine
the best set of road intersections to function as mix-zones
based on the user arrival rate, the transition probabilities
at the junctions and the speed characteristics of the road
segments.
A.0.4 Mix-zone Placement
The mix-zone placement component is responsible for
deploying the mix-zones in the road network. In a huge
road network of several tens of thousands of road junctions,
the critical decision of which road junctions function as
mix-zones can significantly impact the anonymity of the
users. Improper selection of road junctions may result in
unacceptably large size of mix-zones due to low user arrival
rate or skewed transition probability distribution in the
junctions. The placement module has knowledge of the
road network topology, road characteristics in terms of road
segment speed and arrival rate and also the mobility profiles
of the users in terms of the transitioning probabilities at
the road junction. MobiMix implements three mix-zone
placement techniques namely (i) Naive Placement, (ii) Road
characteristics aware (top-n) placement and (iii) Quadtree
based (Grid) Network-aware placement.
A.0.5 Computing Infrastructure
The anonymizer with its monitoring sub-components run in
a computing infrastructure. This computing infrastructure
2can be a dedicated infrastructure within the anonymizer’s
organization. Here, a set of servers would be reponsible for
anonymizing users in one geographical area and each server
gets to receive only the location updates corresponding to
its geographic area thereby balancing the overall load in
the system.
APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION OF PLACEMENT ALGORITHMS
An optimal solution to the mix-zone placement problem
may be obtained using a formulation similar to that dis-
cussed in [14], however such optimal solutions to the
placement problem become NP-complete for even small
road networks. In this appendix, we present three heuristic-
based strategies for mix-zone placement. The mix-zone
placement algorithms find the best set of road intersections
to function as mix-zones based on the user arrival rates,
statistics of user movements, road network topology and
road characteristics in terms of mean user speeds and
the temporal and spatial resolution of location exposure.
We know that the anonymity strength of the mix-zone is
directly proportional to the anonymity set size and the
attack resilience of the mix-zone, however, for a given
value of anonymity set size, k, the size of the mix-zone
is directly proportional to the arrival rate of the users
form various road segments connected to the road junction
and the skewness in the transition probability distribution.
Therefore, the cost of a mix-zone is directly proportional to
the size of the mix-zone as it directly impacts the limits on
the usage of the location based service. A good placement
algorithm should provide sufficient anonymity in each of
the mix-zones, should also ensure that users go through
sufficient number of mix-zones along their path to the
destination, while minimizing the total number of mix-
zones maintained in the system.
B.1 Naive Placement
In the naive placement scheme, the mix-zones are chosen
based on only the structure of the intersections, considering
only those that connect to three or more road segments.
This set of road intersections forms the candidate set of
mix-zones. Among the candidate set of road intersections,
the mix-zones are placed by choosing a random subset
of the candidate set of mix-zones. Although this straight-
foward approach of mix-zone placement is aware of the
road intersection topology, the approach lacks knowledge of
the user arrival rate and user travel characteristics and hence
it does not make careful decisions to minimize the cost of
the constructed mix-zones. For example, even road inter-
sections having low user arrival rates and skewed transition
probability distributions may get chosen for placing mix-
zones. However, constructing mix-zones at them would lead
to huge mix-zone sizes in order for them to be sufficiently
resilient to timing and transition attacks. Hence, the overall
cost of the mix-zone placement in the naive approach may
not be minimal.
B.2 Road-aware top -n Placement
In this placement methodology, the mix-zones are placed
at intersections that have high density of traffic and low
skewness in the transition probability distribution. The mix-
zones constructed at such intersections are small in size,
incurring minimal cost in terms of limiting the service
inside the mix-zones. All the mix-zones are constructed
to yield a certain lower-bounded anonymity in terms of
the anonymity set size, k, and resilience to timing and
transition attacks. This is done by carefully choosing the
time window,  to ensure that sufficient number of vehicles
arrive in the anonymizing time window and the size of
the mix-zone in such a way that every member of the
anonymity set has a high pairwise entropy after transition
and timing attacks. In this approach, the top-n mix-zones
are selected based on their average estimated anonymity
levels of the road intersections, precisely in terms of the
cost of the mix-zones. If C(v) is the cost of the mix-zone
constructed at road junction v for the privacy guarantees
Hmin. The selection algorithm sorts the road junctions in
the increasing order of the cost of the mix-zones C(v) and
chooses the top-n candidates for the placement. Although,
this approach minimizes the overall cost of the mix-zones
in the road network, the distribution of the mix-zones may
not be uniform across the road network. For example, while
some parts of the network may be densely populated with
mix-zones, some other parts may be very scarce in mix-
zones. As a result, users following some trajectories will
pass through unnecessarily more mix-zones, while some
users may not be able to find sufficient mix-zones in their
trajectories.
B.3 Quadtree/Grid Network-aware Placement
In the quadtree-based network-aware approach, the place-
ment algorithm considers the topology of the road map
in addition to the user and road characteristics. Similar to
the top-n placement approach, this approach also considers
only road intersections having low skewness in transition
probability and high traffic arrival rates. However in order
to ensure a uniform distribution of the mix-zones, the place-
ment decision is made by closely considering the underly-
ing road network topology. For instance, the placement of
the mix-zones should ensure that the trajectories followed
by the users have sufficient number of mix-zones at evenly
separated distances. Hence, the mix-zone deployment in
the road network has to ensure saptial uniformity while
minimizing the overall cost of the mix-zones in terms of
their size.
The Quadtree-based network-aware placement is a two
phase algorithm. The first phase of the algorithm recursively
divides the entire road map to construct a quadtree index.
The quadtree construction divides the area based on the
number of road junctions in it, the overall geographical area
and the total length of the road segments and the number
of candidate junctions for mix-zones. The algorithm dy-
namically decides and partitions if it needs to recursively
partition the space further into four quadrants. At the end of
the quadtree construction, each quadrant roughly consists
3Fig. 2: Grid-based Placement
of the same number of road junctions, total segment length
and number of candidate mix-zones as shown in figure 2.
The second phase of the algorithm deploys the mix-
zones on a quadrant by quadrant basis. In each quadrant,
the algorithm attempts to deploy the same number of
mix-zones, however, the decision of which road junctions
function as mix-zones is done to minimize the overall mix-
zone cost while maximizing the average distance between
any pair of mix-zones in a given quadrant. The objective is
to maximize the pairwise distance between the mix-zones
while not exceeding a certain specified maximum cost.
This ensures that the mix-zones are uniformly distributed
within each quadrant achieving higher spatial uniformity.
Let Q represent the set of quadrants in the road network
and let each quadrant, q have m mix-zones. If Vq and Mq
respectively represent the set of all intersections in quadrant
q and the set of intersections that functions as mix-zones
in quadrant, q 2 Q, then the objective function is given by
min
q2Q
X
v1;v22Mq
dist(v1; v2)
subject to the constraints:X
v2Vq
xv = mX
v2Vq
C(v)xv  Cmax m
where xv is a boolean variable indicating if vertex v 2 Vq
is a mix-zone and vertex v belongs to Mq if xv = 1.
APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The GTMobiSim mobile simulator extracts the road net-
work based on three types of roads   expressway, arterial
and collector roads. Our experimentation uses maps from
three geographic regions namely that of Chamblee and
Northwest Atlanta regions of Georgia and San Jose West
region of California to generate traces for a two hour
duration. We generate a set of 10,000 cars on the road
network that are randomly placed on the road network
according to a uniform distribution. The speed of the cars
are distributed based on the road class categories as shown
in Table 1. We use the Random Router mobility model
in GTMobiSim where Cars generate random trips with
source and destination chosen randomly and shortest path
routing is used to route the cars for the random trips. This
captures more realistic scenarios than the random walk
model. For instance, unlike the random walk model, the
highway roads and expressways are more populated than
the small residential roads as these roads share more parts
of the shortest paths used by the users. Also, the random
router model gives more realistic transition probabilities at
the junctions which is essential to our evaluation.
Road type Expressway Arterial Collector
Mean speed(mph) 60 50 25
Std. dev.(mph) 20 15 10
Speed Distribution Gaussian Gaussian Gaussian
TABLE 1: Motion Parameters
Parameter Value
Map Northwest Atlanta region
Mobility Model Random Roadnet Router
Total number of vehicles 10000
Number of Road junctions 6831
Number of Road segments 9187
TABLE 2: Simulation Parameters and Setting
APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
D.0.1 Significance of Transition Attack
We study the significance of protecting mix-zones against
transition attack by measuring the distribution of the pair-
wise entropy among the road junctions based on the
skewness in their transition probabilities. We show the
distribution of worst case and average pairwise entropies
after transition attack in table 3 for the Northwest Atlanta
map of Georgia. The worst case refers to the least possible
pairwise entropy obtained in the junction. We notice that
most junctions have only reasonably high average pairwise
entropy after transition attack, suggesting that the transition
probabilities at these junction do not follow an uniform
distribution. We find that only less than 12 % of the
junctions have a high pairwise entropy in the range 0.9 to
1.0 after the transition attack. Also, the worst case entropy
of many junctions (more than 90%) have a low value of
0, corresponding to the mappings that indicate an U -turn.
Clearly, in these cases of low pairwise entropy, the attacker
would able to eliminate the mappings if transition attack is
not handled properly in the mix-zone construction.
(a) Average
H(i;j) % of junctions
0.0-0.1 0
0.1-0.2 0
0.2-0.3 0
0.3-0.4 0
0.4-0.5 0.25
0.5-0.6 1.33
0.6-0.7 7.75
0.7-0.8 37.75
0.8-0.9 41.33
0.9-1.0 11.58
(b) Worst case
H(i;j) % of junctions
0.0-0.1 95.58
0.1-0.2 0.166
0.2-0.3 0.5
0.3-0.4 0.42
0.4-0.5 0.25
0.5-0.6 0.42
0.6-0.7 0.33
0.7-0.8 1.0
0.8-0.9 0.58
0.9-1.0 0.75
TABLE 3: Pairwise Entropy with Transition attack
4D.0.2 Success Rate and Relative Anonymity
In order to measure the effectiveness of the mix-zones, we
study the success rate of them in providing the expected
value of k. Here, the expected probability of getting k or
more users, p is taken to be 0.9 and the value of k is varied
from 2 to 11. Figure 3(a) shows the comparison of the
success rate among the mix-zone approaches. A mix-zone
is considered successfull for an user if the user has at least
k other users in its anonymity set with pairwise entropies
greater than 0.9 under both timing and transition attacks.
As evident from the figure, the TWB non-rectangular mix-
zones have the highest success rate, the other mix-zones
have low success rate due to their lack of resilience to
timing attack. In order to compare the level of anonymity
offered by the mix-zones with the anonymity expected from
them, we measure relative anonymity which is defined as
the ratio of the value of obtained k to the value of expected
k. Figure 3(b) shows the variation of relative-k of TWB
non-rectangular mix-zones with respect to the expected
value of k for different geographic maps. The expected
success rate is set to 90%. The graphs show that the value
of relative k lies within the range of 2 to 3, meaning that
the mix-zone on an average offers two to three times the
anonymity requested by the users.
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